The Cost of Conscience:
Quantifying our Charitable Burden in an Era of Globalization
Who that cares much to know the history of man…has not dwelt, at least briefly, on the life of Saint Theresa? Theresa's passionate, ideal nature demanded an epic life… [and] she found her epos in the reform of a religious order. [But] [m]any Theresas have been born who found for themselves no epic life wherein there was a constant unfolding of far-resonant action; perhaps only a life of mistakes, the offspring of a certain spiritual grandeur ill-matched with the meanness of opportunity…. With dim lights and tangled circumstance they tried to shape their thought and deed in noble agreement; but…were helped by no coherent social faith and order which could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul.
--George Eliot, Middlemarch
When he was twenty-nine, Albert Schweitzer was about to engage in a promising career as a theologian and preacher. The young Schweitzer had committed himself to what, he then thought, were the highest things-a life of contemplation and moral teaching. But he was also troubled by his decision. He reflected in his autobiography that, " [w] hile at the University and enjoying the happiness of being able to study and even to produce some results in science and art, I could not help thinking continually of others who were denied that happiness by their material circumstances or their health." 1 He resolved that he "must not accept this happiness as a matter of course, but must give something in return for it." 2 And at that point he made his famous commitment, "to consider myself justified in living till I was thirty for science and art, in order to devote myself from that time forward to the direct service of humanity." 3 He thereafter committed himself to medical service in Equatorial Africa. Schweitzer is an exemplar-a paragon of self-sacrifice. As Susan Wolf argues, it is unwise to make "moral saints" the measure of our ethical aspirations. 4 But his example still exerts moral pull-as a beacon of compassion we might reflect imperfectly in our own lives. For who among us can simply ignore the plight of the poorest? What
American can reflectively believe he deserves the affluence he is born into? 5 Like the healthy person shamed into quiet moroseness by the close presence of a dying relation, 6 are we not called upon to temper our enjoyment of this world's plenty with some awareness of the third world's scarcity? 7 Isn't sharing more, more than a supererogatory duty?
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Whatever the present merits of these emotional responses as apprehensions of moral duty, they are becoming more plausible given the collapse of traditional political mechanisms of mutual aid. As Robert Kaplan has documented, "scarcity, crime, overpopulation, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet." 9 With the collapse of state institutions in afflicted regions, humanitarian interventions from nongovernmental organizations offered the best hope for many troubled regions. The corruption of recipient "governments" and lack of funding for NGO's present the chief obstacles to these interventions. Thankfully, the World Bank is fighting corruption in order to enable NGO's to provide immediate relief and to rebuild institutions of self- 4 Wolf, Moral Saints, J. Phil. 1980. 5 Cf. Hilary Putnam, "All men are brothers," (in collection on genetic engineering/Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999) 6 See, e.g,, Proust at beginning of Remembrance of Things Past (near his sick aunt); David Leavitt's protagonist in Equal Affections. 7 Such memento mori's appear in several cultural traditions, such as the breaking of a glass at many Jewish weddings. 8 For an attack on the notion of supererogatory duties, see J. Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM. 9 Atlantic Article.
sufficiency. But how can NGO's do the work of governments when they lack the power to tax? Can new norms generate income when laws cannot?
Philosophers, theologians, and human rights activists have tried to generate such norms. They have addressed the personal responsibility of the well-off for the welfare of citizens of less developed countries. 10 The United Nations Development Program has long announced targets for foreign aid contributions from wealthy countries. But philosophers like Peter Singer, Peter Unger, and G.A. Cohen suggest that these countries'
citizens have a parallel moral responsibility to tithe a portion of their income directly for the relief of the poorest. Whereas Singer and Unger present strictly utilitarian arguments to this effect, 11 Cohen explores a variety of ethical frameworks which could demand such a result.
All these thinkers would prefer a systematic global redistribution of incomesome public mechanism for accomplishing worldwide what the tax systems of egalitarian social democratic states accomplish. But they all realize that such global governance is unlikely to come about in any of our lifetimes. So they turn their attention to individuals-Singer and Unger to persons generally, and Cohen to "rich egalitarians" who share his political concerns and lifestyle. All believe that giving more to the poor is not simply "supererogatory"-i.e., "something beyond duty that it would be especially admirable to do." 12 They have begun to quantify a moral obligation of charitable support.
And though the amount suggested is much higher in the case of Unger and Singer than 10 Barry and Satz on shift to cosmopolitan notion of justice in Global Justice. Brian Barry argues that: "individuals, rather than corporate entities of any sort-be they families, communities, or nations-are the appropriate subjects for all claims about justice." Id., 3. 11 Utilitarianism is a consequentialist maximizing welfarism. Sen, Choice Welfare, and Measurement. 12 Cohen, 178. that of Cohen, all three thinkers advance principles which could significantly impact the way we think about charity.
Like Schweitzer, these thinkers would have us believe that we are obliged in some way to systematically care for those much worse off. But unlike Schweitzer, they do not ground these duties in an ecumenically religious ethic of Reverence for Life. Rather, they present strictly philosophical arguments. Singer and Unger systematically compare our behavior in a variety of situations and infer duties from the comparison. If we would spend $500 to rescue a dying person by the side of the road, why not $50 to feed someone about to starve in Africa? Cohen provides less systematic but more nuanced reflections on the same problem in his Gifford Lectures. He asks about the relationship between personal behavior and political philosophy-and the necessary cost of espousing egalitarian beliefs.
Although Singer has gotten a great deal of media attention, 13 and Unger has been praised by Richard Posner as perhaps the only recent moral philosopher to seriously aspire to moral entrepreneurship, 14 neither of these thinkers has been well-received by the wider public. This is not simply a matter of public obliviousness to the very serious issues each of them raises. Rather, the writers themselves avoid many of the hardest questions their approaches suggest. Neither of the utilitarians convincingly draws a line between necessity, convenience, and luxury-essential distinctions for those urging others to rethink their "unnecessary" consumption. Cohen is more subtle, but he too does not adequately concretize his proposed ethical framework. Simplifying radically, but still capturing the gist of the story, Singer tells of the dilemma faced by the film's protagonist, Dora. Dora is a middle-aged messenger and letter-writer who leads an impoverished but secure life. One day, she is offered $1000 to accompany a young boy to an "adoption agency." She buys a few small luxuries with the money (her first TV set, some cosmetics). But a neighbor cuts short her jubilation by letting her know that the boy is likely too old to be adopted-and that such "agencies"
often kill their charges in order to sell their organs on the black market. After some agonizing, Dora "redeems herself" by rescuing the boy from the agency.
Singer notes that though most viewers in affluent societies "would have been quick to condemn Dora if she had not rescued the boy," they daily ignore less onerous opportunities for saving lives. There are nearly a billion people in the world who now live in absolute poverty. 17 There are well-organized and efficient relief agencies capable of helping more of them-if only they had more funding. Meanwhile, "the average family in the United States spends almost one-third of its income on things that are no more necessary to them than Dora's new TV was to her." 18 Had Central Station really mirrored our moral lives, Singer suggests, Dora would have stayed and home and watched TV.
Singer concedes that one can draw distinctions between Dora's behavior and our own-for example, the gap between acts and omissions. 19 He concedes that Dora was directly involved in the child's plight-she gained by putting him in harm's way. But he 17 As Singer defines it in Practical Ethics (using terms employed by the World Bank), "Absolute poverty is the lack of sufficient income in cash or kind to meet the most basic biological needs for food, clothing, and shelter." PE, 220. 18 Medical Economics article, 277. Singer's examples include "Going out to nice restaurants, buying new clothes because the old ones are no longer stylish, vacationing at beach resorts--so much of our income is spent on things not essential to the preservation of our lives and health." Id. 19 For a good recent critique of that distinction, see Sunstein, The Partial Constitution. But see F. Schauer, Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism (Ethics).
notes that, for a utilitarian philosopher, history doesn't matter-what matters are the consequences of our actions. And he notes that the consequences of a rich individual failing to give are not much different from the consequences of a Dora who failed to rescue. In the same manner, Singer dismisses a number of other distinctions as "missing the point." Certainly there are "practical uncertainties about whether aid will really reach the people who need it"-but Singer assures us that, with a little research, we can easily find agencies standing at the front lines of need. He even gives their phone numbers.
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Singer's reflections on Central Station apply a moral principle he articulated long ago: "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it…" 21 (I shall heretofore refer to this idea as "Singer's Principle of Obligation.") Singer lists a number of everyday consumption choices-from new clothing to dining out-that are not as morally significant as improving the lives of the poor. He notes that, while his principle appears uncontroversial, "If it were taken seriously and acted upon, our lives would and our world would be fundamentally changed." When asked to quantify our charitable obligations in a public interview, he proposed that nearly everyone should give away nearly everything they make above $30,000.
Singer's philosophical reflections and practice are more measured. He gives onefifth of his income to charity. 22 His first article on the topic acknowledged that "any figure would be arbitrary, but there may be something to be said for a round percentage 20 According to his research, "Three million children die each year of dehydrating diarrhea, and this can be prevented with packets of oral rehydration salts that cost a mere 15 cents a packet; with a few of these and some necessary overheads we can each save a life for well under $5." 21 PE 229. 22 Although Singer gives 20% of his income to charity, he still "indulges" in many of the luxuries his book theoretically condemns. consider in more detail the demands of relations in Section IV below.
Unger pushes Singer's utilitarian position to its limits. He criticizes anyone who takes vacations or engages in other "luxury spending" because they're depriving the poor of these funds. While Singer circumscribes his discussion to persons' management of their own lives, Unger recommends that his readers steal from wealthy persons if that stealing would, on balance, relieve suffering. Unger presents the duty to relieve absolute 31 140. 32 :Singer's principle: "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it…" Singer asserts that "I have left the idea of moral significance unexamined in order to show that the argument does not depend on any specific values or ethical principles." (231). 33 Unger, 12.
poverty as an absolute-the moral equivalent of war. As such, the ends justifies whatever means necessary to achieve them.
Singer takes as a baseline his readers' present careers and social positions. Unger thinks these, too, are obliged to change if they do not presently reflect the demands of his principle. He claims that nearly all corporate law professors are immoral, because they could relieve suffering more by maximizing their salary at a law firm and then donating it. 34 He encourages young philosophers to get out of the field in order to make more money, again to donate to the poorest. 
C) G.A. Cohen: A Limited Defense of the "Rich Egalitarian"
Cohen suggests a "back-handed" defense of Singer's position that may contain Unger's extremism. He does so by considering excuses and justifications that a nongiving egalitarian could offer in defense of his inaction. Cohen wants to explore "what justice demands of individuals in an unjust society," particularly those who recognize the society's injustice. 36 He asks "whether egalitarians who live in an unequal society….are committed to implementing, so far as they can, in their own lives, the norm of equality that they prescribe for the government." 37 Throughout the essay he entertains arguments for and against the proposition that a wealthy person is morally bound to give away at least some of his wealth to ease their plight.
Cohen claims that the rich egalitarian can defend his practices in three ways.
"Within the general category of justifications 38 for not performing action X (here, X is yielding up one's riches), one can distinguish between those that (1) make it wrong to do X and those that (2) make X neither obligatory nor wrong. One can, moreover, distinguish, within the latter subcategory, between justifications that (2a) do, and those that (2b) do not, make X 'supererogatory'--something beyond duty that it would be especially admirable to do." 39 Cohen considers five arguments of the type 2b variety, three of the type 2a variety, and a three of the type 1 variety-i.e., claims that such giving is simply wrong. I will consider Cohen's responses to each of these "defenses" of the rich egalitarian in reverse order, ranging from the mildest to the strongest. generally good, there is no duty to be charitable. Nagel argues that it is "acceptable to compel people to contribute to the support of the indigent by automatic taxation, but unreasonable to insist in the absence of such a system they ought to contribute 37 149. 38 cf. Austin, excuses 39 Cf. Raz (against the supererogatory?) 40 (The numbering above does not map to the numbering below.) 41 160.
voluntarily…." 42 Nagel claims that "this is partly due to lack of assurance that others would do likewise and fear of relative disadvantage; but it is also a sensible rejection of excessive demands on the will, which can be more irksome than automatic demands on the purse." 43 Cohen deals with each of these two arguments, which he calls (respectively) the "mental burden" concern and the "relative disadvantage" problem.
While Cohen finds the first argument specious, he lends a bit too much credence to the "relative disadvantage" problem, and to a cognate concerns about the welfare of those with "expensive tastes."
a) The Mental Burden of Self-Taxation
Nagel's position may make sense if, as a matter of pure theory, we are, ex ante, trying to choose between a regime of taxation (allocated to NGO's) and a regime of private support. His realism is a needed corrective to the libertarian fetishization of the voluntary-and to the religious hope of moral improvement via self-sacrifice. 44 For sacrifice means not only making holy, but also gving up something important. 45 When that giving up is part of the background of expectations,] it takes less moral energy to accept than when it must be done sua sponte.
But as a matter of applied moral theory, Nagel's argument is unconvincing.
Cohen reflects on the mental burden argument by revisiting an ancient dispute in Greek philosophy. While Socrates "thought it was impossible to do intentionally what you think it wrong to do," Aristotle recognized the problem of akrasia, or weakness of will. Although akrasia is a complex fact of our psychological makeup, it is by no means a norm to be valued. With automatic bank drafts, "giving off one's own bat and the state's just taking" are almost equally easy to do. 47 And given that one knows precisely where one's funds are destined in the former case, it ought in fact be easier to do, since results can be more directly monitored.
2) Relative Disadvantage in One's Peer Group
Nagel's second objection is more difficult. If all of one's friends and neighbors were to join in the project, engaged in common sacrifice, the worry over falling out of Cohen thinks this point has some substance: the relative disadvantage problem suggests that "equality is, necessarily, a social project." It certainly is unfortunate to be separated by money from one's friends, or to consign one's children to any situation not maximally capable of promoting their academic, social, athletic, and musical capabilities. 51 The kinds of demands posed by friends and family, both explicit and implicit, have a great deal of "moral significance." But whether they are of "comparable moral significance" to the alleviation of absolute poverty is another matter. For a hard "do-nothing" position, far from merely accommodating the prevailing ethos of selfishness in one's peer group, actually reinforces it. 52 One is not merely acting within an unjust social structure, but promoting its preservation.
It is strange that Cohen does not make this point here, because he brilliantly conveys it earlier in his book. As Cohen notes, the great liberal fallacy about the site of distributive justice (particularly in evidence in Rawls) is that "the fundamental principles of justice apply to the rules of the basic structure of society, and not to the choices people make within that structure, beyond their choices about whether or not to promote, support, and comply with the rules of a just basic structure." 53 The liberal position may have been convincing when we were less aware of the effects of social norms. But the Rawlsian quest for a just "basic structure" of society, within which individuals have the greatest liberty compatible with a like liberty for others, becomes ever more misguided as we understand the cognitive impact of the decisions of neighbors and peers. Even very personal decisions (such as a driver's decision to purchase an SUV) have important 51 Re kinds of flourishing and education: see Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences. 52 Cf. my Rawls essay on accommodation vs. promotion of pluralism. 53 148.
consequences for the justice of a society (by, for example, helping create social norms that encourage the proliferation of large vehicles).
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A Rawlsian basic structure is not on the political horizon. As even vague and inferior versions of it recede from the horizon of possibility, personal decisions become ever more important to the accomplishment of justice. Perhaps one can argue that the "reinforcement effect" (of capitulating to the consumption standards of one's peer group)
is so small as to be swamped by the general "relative disadvantage" concern. But I think it is a powerful argument for at least dropping to a lower level of consumption within one's peer group for the sake of aiding the poorest. Conspicuous consumption is simply unacceptable. Any attempt to gain in prestige merely by consuming more than one's peers is always suspect. Perhaps the only respectable relative deprivation arguments boil down to "self-defeat" or "culturalist" positions-which I explore in sections * below.
3) Special Deprivation: Expensive or Expansive Tastes?
Cohen relates Nagel's second, social objection to a third one of his own devising: the special deprivation argument. A "rich egalitarian" reduced to mere petit bourgeoise status by an aggressive program of giving is likely to feel a "constant sense of deprivation" unthinkable to one who has lived at that level his entire life. 55 Sen's capabilities approach would respond to expensive needs, but not expensive tastes.
Cohen resists Sen's account as too close to the "objective virtue" school. 60 He believes that while both welfare and resources count, and they can't be reconciled so neatly into a "capabilities" approach. His residual sympathy for the potential loss of subjective welfare by those committed to serious giving suggests that he believes they have some right to continue indulging their expensive tastes even when those tastes clearly rise above the level of necessity. He admits that he "has not applied that view to the issues addressed here…reserv[ing] the task of doing so for a future and more systematically structured study of the 'rich egalitarian' problem."
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In section IV below I try to respond to this call for further research. My effort to construct a procedural and substantive ethics of consumption draws on religious traditions of East and West, as well as modern research on the psychology of satisfaction.
I shall argue that we are morally obliged to gradually pare down our expensive tastes in order to relieve the plight of the poor. But as Cohen reminds us, "'Negligible' can mean 'numerically small, relative to the total picture,' but it can also mean 'unimportant,' and neglibility in the first of these senses does not entail negligibility in the second." 64 If the fire trucks don't exist, the bucket brigades can at least permit a few more people to escape. I recall once attending a "Key Club" community service convention in high school where one of the speakers addressed the "drop in the bucket" problem. He compared our small efforts in soup kitchens to a man who comes upon a seashore dotted with thousands of dying starfish, and throws back one each time he goes on a walk. Eventually someone questions him about the futility of his endeavor. The man replies: "It makes a difference to that starfish!"
2)
The Real Problem is Unequal Power
Of course, the story is double-edged. It reminds us that we cannot turn away from the persons in the Save the Children advertisements simply by retreating to a detached perspective on the futility of the effort to save them. But any argument that relies on an analogy of the poor to invertebrates is deeply troubling. Many individuals find the very idea of "charity" morally offensive. repugnant. Since poverty relief efforts presuppose a wealthier class helping a poorer one, they "fail to touch the fundamental injustice, which is the structured inequality of power between the rich and poor." As the major institutions-business and government-comprise the power structure of society, some idealists are allowed…to work in small outposts of the empire to feed the homeless, care for the sick, and minister to the wounded. The more idealistic and different from the dominant organizations a charity is….the more likely its workers are to be poorly paid or serve as volunteers.
To Wagner, charity work diverts the best efforts of those who might otherwise be making society more just.
Despite the power of these critiques of charity, they do not touch the fundamental obligation of persons to do something to promote the well-being of the poor. If a critic of charity truly believes such activity only delays the "day of reckoning," he ought to contribute something to an organization devoted to hastening it. Far from being an excuse for quiescence, this perspective on the "futility of charity" obliges its adherents to
give even more to politics. inequality with a curious mixture of optimism and fatalism. We hope consumer demand will somehow permit the poor to earn a decent living. Faith in the invisible hand feeds on a tacit conviction that "progress" is inevitable and unchannelable.
The dogmatic market stance of Rand, Hayek, or P.T. Bauer is not the only variant on this position. The social theory and history of Adam Smith also supports such conservatism. Smith suggested that the nobility's penchant for "baubles" and other luxuries was the key reason for the expansion of middle class wealth and power in early modernity. Stable economic progress depended on an orderly exchange of goods of resources that gradually sparked a convergence of the living standards of the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Smith's history suggests that modernization was inevitably a slow and arduous process. Efforts to speed it up could have disastrous consequences. Even many progressives today insist that "trade, not aid" is essential to a stable economic order.
As the US learned in the 1930s and Japan is learning now, thrift is paradoxical: when too many people save, the entire economy is prone to collapse. Free-marketeers suggest there may be a similar paradox of charity. Given the enormous complexity of world trade, it is hard to write off this caution as callousness. Individuals who choose to give away money, instead of investing it, may be shifting funds from enterprises that would create permanent and sustainable development instead of mere relief. The shift might spark a general crisis of confidence that reduced welfare overall. Certainly the current economic slowdown shows how much economic growth depends on the tenuous reed of future expectations. As theorists of chaos suggest, a small decision can have immense knock-on effects. 68 If a butterfly in Bali can cause a hurricane in the Bahamas, perhaps a foregone pair of Nikes in Indiana can cause a factory shut-down in Indonesia?
Perhaps. But certainly this objection is speculative. A supply-side, investmentoriented theory of economic growth may be popular, but is by no means the consensus position among economists. As a Keynesian might note, the distribution of money to people who desperately need to spend it may stimulate the global economy more than continued accumulation by those who can afford to save. As for the long-term perspective on modernization: well, as Keynes said, in the long run, we're all dead.
Libertarians might frame the global economy as a "rising tide that lifts all boats," but the rise of intellectual property transactions means that global wealth is increasingly trapped in ethereal digital transfers, rarely trickling down to the poor. The market is too slow and unpredictable a mechanism to relieve their suffering.
This is not to suggest that the first paradox of charity can be dismissed out of hand as an excuse for not giving. But it certainly cannot be advanced as a knock-down case for 
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These are valid criticisms of certain kinds of aid to the poor, but certainly not of aid-as-such. It is unfortunate that the Sudanese stopped farming when aid arrived, but isn't their position analogous to that of a woman on welfare who hopes to complete a high school education before going to work, instead of being forced into a dead-end job immediately? As the leader of one of the world's leading relief organizations has observed, Many people, perhaps the majority today, do not have the means which would enable them to take their place in an effective and humanly dignified way within a productive system in which work is truly central. intervening at all. Rather, it should simply stand as a reminder to givers to assure they direct their money to the most efficient relief and reform organizations.
The cultural argument also rings hollow. Certainly it should give us pause before we send off missionaries to unexplored corners of Africa or South America. But by and large the relevant poor "crowd the cities of the Third World where they are often without cultural roots and are exposed to situations of violent uncertainty with no possibility of becoming integrated." 73 People by and large need a basic level of security before they can enjoy and propagate their culture. 74 We should not deny the vast majority of the world's poor the opportunity to do so based on romantic notions about "tribes" untouched by civilization. And if we seriously believe that charity efforts ignore the political dimension of poverty, we should allocate funds to those organizations which address it.
D) A Summary of the lessons of Singer, Unger, and Cohen
Singer, Unger, and Cohen each treat our present neglect of the world's poorest as a great collective and individual moral failing. As Stuart Hampshire observes in a passage on the nature of moral blindness, "No doubt our grandchildren will ask, 'How can they have failed to see the injustice of allowing billionaires to multiply while the very Bob is close to retirement. He has invested most of his savings in a very rare and valuable old car, a Bugatti, which he has not been able to insure…In addition to the pleasure he gets from driving and caring for his car, Bob knows that its rising market value means that he will always be able to sell it and live comfortably after retirement. One day when Bob is out for a drive, he parks the Bugatti near the end of a railway siding and goes for a walk up the track. As he does so, he sees that a runaway train, with no one aboard, is running down the railway track. Looking farther down the track, he sees the small figure of a child very likely to be killed by the runaway train. He can't stop the train and the child is too far away to warn of the danger, but he can throw a switch that will divert the train down the siding where his Bugatti is parked. Then nobody will be killed--but the train will destroy his Bugatti. Thinking of his joy in owning the car and the financial security it represents, Bob decides not to throw the switch. The child is killed. For many years to come, Bob enjoys owning his Bugatti and the financial security it represents.
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Unger would have us believe that, each time we fail to sacrifice some of our disposable income for the relief of the poorest, we act like Bob. But, as Berkowitz notes, the example "radically simplifies matters:" Bob appears to be wifeless, childless, parentless, and friendless. And Bob appears to have only two choices: he can save his prized possession and personal fortune, which will allow the child to die, or, saving the child, Bob can allow his financial security to be wiped out…To replicate the situation in which we actually find ourselves, [the] example would not only have to allow degrees of generosity, it would also have to incorporate a variety of factors and recognize a range of tradeoffs.
Berkowitz notes that "in our lives we must balance sacrifices in personal wealth against, among other things, the kind of injuries that we can practicably prevent, the number of innocent sufferers involved, the proximity of those in need to us, and the cost of our benevolence to those whom we love and with whom we share our lives." 78 Without considering all the potential tradeoffs involved, Berkowitz suggests, the moral intuitions of an Unger or a Singer are worthless as practical guides to action.
Nevertheless, awareness of the "many textures and myriad colors of the moral life" 79 does not force us to reject the moral force of these admittedly abstract hypotheticals.
Once we do flesh them out, we find that there are two main kinds of obligations that stand in the way of more giving to the poor: the material claims of family and dependents, and non-material goals that are simply incommensurable with the utilitarian concern with the welfare of the poorest. I discuss each of these rival claims below.
A) The Material Needs of Relations
As mentioned above, some of the utilitarian advocates of quantified charitable burdens are merciless in their demands from the wealthy. that, in violation of his own precepts, he spends thousands of dollars each year to care for his ailing mother-money that would, by his own account, be better spent in preventing multiple deaths in the poorest regions of the world.
Unger attempts to deconstruct the intuitions that lead us to approve of Singer's conduct, but with little success. 81 The demands and needs of family surpass reason and impartiality. To deny one's children an upbringing at least as good as one's own, or to deny one's parents life-extending health care (or even small luxuries at the end of life) roils the conscience. To do so in the name of morality seems perverse, since our relations are often the strongest of our "moral sources:" inculcators of the habits and attitudes most central to a moral life, including the capacity to love and to empathize. what we need and what we owe one another. 83 When the very poor drop off our moral map, we can grow myopic about our obligations to those nearest us. I would like to propose some guidelines, both substantive and procedural, to bring us closer to a true brotherhood of man. 84 Although they may seem unduly harsh or unrealistic in personal relations, they are also meant to serve as guides to societal allocations of resourceswhere they might be put into practice with less controversy. 
1) The Limits of Children's Obligations to Parents: An Investment Theory
As medical interventions become more sophisticated and complex, growing numbers of persons face a dilemma as their parents age. Decent nursing home or other care may cost $80,000 per year. Drug costs can easily reach $3,000 per month. Is a child obliged to take care of whatever medical or other needs arise, even to the exclusion of obligations to charity? 85 When the medical profession declares death itself a disease, how much spending on life-extension is merited? 86 As living standards diverge, it is easy to imagine citizens of the first world locked into obligations to provide for one another's "needs"--needs that are unimaginable luxuries in the third world.
I believe that one can only understand the problem in terms of a larger social transformation in the delivery of health care. While citizens of the US used to expect that programs like Medicaid and Medicare would fully fund their health needs in retirement, societal commitments in this area are slowly being rolled back. We will likely evolve (or regress) to a point where the only guarantee of health care is the individual purchase of long-term health care insurance.
As we transition to this state, adults are still obliged to provide care for their parents when they need it. But they cannot simply ignore the needs of those who are much poorer, and who have not even had a chance at the experiences enjoyed (or offered)
to them or their parents. To reconcile the two obligations, a person might calculate how much a needy parent would have made had they invested all the money they spent raising the person in some kind of medical savings account or cognate scheme. The amount due 85 Compare bankruptcy cases on whether tithing obligations can be diverted to creditors. Obviously these calculations are difficult and complex. They would be more humanely disposed of via a collective, political process. But we are moving further away from such patterns of mutual aid with each passing year. With the devolution of power to individuals comes the devolution of responsibility. As difficult as quantifying our obligations to parents might be, it is certainly less morally irresponsible than simply spending without limit to support them, when the costs of preserving life in the third world are so much lower.
2) The Limits of Parents' Obligations to Children: An Opportunity Theory
The situation facing parents at the beginning of their children's life is less grim Any realistic answer would at least include the following condition: with hard work and application, the most intelligent among the poorest within one's community would be able to attend the educational institution to which one sends one's children.
Like the "class-mixing" proposed by Mickey Kaus to combat the pernicious effects of "assortative mating," the permeability of educational institutions to those who started with little in part legitimizes their role in providing the wealthy the opportunity to continue to have a lot. 88 A continuing commitment to scholarships and other forms of financial aid is further evidence of an institution's willingness to end the patterns of segregation that leave the poor invisible to us. Any favoritism for "legacies" can only be justified economically, as a method for inducing contributions that make the institution more open to the poor.
3) Deliberative Preconditions for Moral Choice
Admittedly, each of the guidelines I have thus far proposed is fuzzy and imprecise. But they play some role in at least conditioning us to think about the poorest as we make our consumption decisions. Is there any other way to refine our deliberations in this manner? Certainly one first step is to budget our contributions to charity annually.
I recall being shocked, after reading Unger's book, to realize that I had likely spent more 88 In his book The End of Equality, Kaus describes the caste-creating effects of "assortative mating"-smart adults tend only to marry other smart adults. With a few soft assumptions about the genetic bases of intelligence, the prospects of a transition from a bell-curve shaped to a bimodal distribution of IQ scores (within a given society) are clear.
money on coffee and desserts in the year before than I had on charity. To budget from an annual perspective at least saves one the embarrassment of that kind of distortion.
There are also ways of formalizing Singer's intuitions. Philosophy may be thought of as a map, alerting us to the morally salient aspects of our decisions while downplaying less important aspects. If conceived in this way, we might usually consider our moral obligations to others as a function of both their need and their relatedness to us:
We are presently comfortable with the idea that there is a group of people (our family and juxtaposes it with a duty to family.
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I think that the extreme need of the poor is just as morally relevant to our decisionmaking as the demands of our family. Just as we consider our children's or needy parents' interests when we make an important life decision, we should consider the plight of the most disadvantaged. 90 For existential choice-where the choice is less a matter of expressing one's ethical commitments, than of constituting and crystallizing a muddy area of them-is an inescapable element of our allocation of resources between those near to and far from us. These choices have deep moral significance, with valences we presently ignore or overlook. Squarely facing their consequences is the first step toward making better ones.
B) Incommensurable Immaterial Aspirations
Colin McGinn's scathing review of Unger's book repeatedly faults him for failing to take into account the diversity of goods. As McGinn writes, If we really lived by the principle that enjoins each of us to reduce our standard of living to such a point that nobody was better off than we were, by donating most of our income to charity…we would be forbidden to…pursue the arts and sciences, to engage in any form of recreation that costs money, and so on.
McGinn considers such a stricture prima facie absurd. We can dismiss some of
McGinn's objections as melodramatic at the outset-the harshness of the perfected application of Unger's principle should not render its partial instantiation risible. But they raise two larger points important even to those who sympathize with Unger's position. The first has to do with the utilitarian penchant for instrumentalizing all experiences. The second relates to the inarticulate, ultimate goals behind the utilitarian project. Consideration of each leads to refinements in our notion of a proper charitable burden.
1) Utilitarianism and Time: Ignoring the Value of One's Non-Charitable Experience for Oneself
As Singer acknowledges, a utilitarian is constantly concerned with the consequences of actions-and not necessarily with the actions themselves. This futureorientation is a step away from wantonness. 91 But it also plays on some of our worst psychological traits. As Pascal explains, Let each of us examine his thoughts; he will find them wholly concerned with the past or the future. We almost never think of the present, and if we do think of it, it is only to see what light it throws on our plans for the future. The present is never our end. The past and the present are our means, the future alone our end. Thus we never actually live, but hope to live, and since we are always planning how to be happy, it is inevitable that we should never be so. practice of meditation permits one to be more empathic to the needs of others. 94 To urge a constant future orientation risks some of the cultural practices-and sheer capacity for relaxation!-that dispose us to care about the poor. What we ultimately want for the most disadvantaged is not simply adequate food and shelter, but lives more like ours.
I mean this not in a concrete, culturally imperialistic sense, but in a more general way: as lives full of opportunities for knowledge, play, love, meaningful (or at least engaging) work, and leisure. 95 In order to want others to have better lives, we need to like our own. Individuals of the first world have something approaching a right to the kinds of art, religion, inquiry, and leisure that make their lives worthwhile-even if these activities demand sacrifices of time or effort that could be allocated to the poor. But they also have a duty to balance these immaterial aspirations against some consideration of the most pressing material needs of the poor. 96 Just as Sartre's would-be soldier considered the needs of his ailing mother when deciding whether to join the resistance, we are morally obliged at least to consider the needs of the poorest before we make a substantial commitment of our resources to any cultural endeavor-ranging from a Muslim's pilgrimage to Mecca to a secular hedonist's purchase of a big-screen television. Adorno's verdict that "no poems can be written after Auschwitz," I believe that any artist or scholar who entirely ignores the great suffering in our midst is simply not serious.
The incommensurabilist critics of Singer, Unger, and Cohen essentially attack straw men. They question is not: "Is any spending on non-charitable culture permitted?" but rather, "Is a failure to give a nontrivial percentage of one's income (above a certain point) to charity morally problematic?" To presume that a moral obligation to some charitable giving is tantamount to an obligation to completely abandon all non-charitable activities is a self-serving reductio ad absurdum worthy of the Pharisees.
IV. The Next Step for Quantifying Charitable Burdens: An Ethics of Consumption
These high-flown reflections on ordering the pursuit of truth and beauty to the demands of justice are only relevant to the boundaries of utilitarian demands-not their main substance. They contain Unger's maximalism, but have little to do with Singer's "Principle of Obligation." 109 Putting the principle into practice simply in the realm of our lives as consumers would do much to advance the welfare of the poorest.
Unfortunately, Singer does not provide us with concrete principles for guiding that process. He does not even attempt to draw a line between necessity, convenience, and luxury-essential distinctions for those urging others to avoid "unnecessary"
consumption. Wishing to avoid absolute and concrete claims, he leaves his proposal unsatisfyingly unspecified. Singer has proven our moral obligation to donate a portion of our income to NGO's serving the world's poorest. But his deliberate eschewal of virtue ethics leaves him ill-equipped to tell us how much is necessary.
This kind of "argumentative abstinence" is unnecessary, and indeed must be replaced with an ethic of consumption and charity in order to give utilitarian ideas real weight and force. There is some middle ground between the saintly rigor of an Elie
Wiesel (who has said that "our lives belong to those who need them most") and the unreflective materialism so common in developed countries. We can find it by articulating a procedural and substantive ethics of consumption, drawing on religious traditions of East and West, as well as modern research on the psychology of satisfaction.
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We are morally obliged to gradually pare down our expensive tastes in order to relieve the plight of the poor-not simply for their sake, but for ours. 111 It is simply grotesque to juxtapose the "epidemic" of obesity in the US with malnutrition in the third 109 : "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it…PE 229. 110 See Ruark, n. * above. 111 Id.
world-but the two problems are intimately related. 112 The level of GDP spent on indisputably harmful things-such as tobacco, alcohol, and firearms-dwarfs our level of giving to the poor. 113 Meanwhile, even self-avowed Christians on average spend more money on pet food and sporting goods than they allocate to church-based poverty relief efforts.
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Amartya Sen offered his capabilities approach as a way of thinking about the problem of redistributing to the poor-that is, of answering hard questions about how to deviate from an equal distribution of resources in order to take care of the special needs of the poor disabled. I think it also has relevance to our way of thinking about the obligations of those who can give, by suggesting a ceiling for their consumption-one that provides the secure with a decent range of capabilities, but not the full menu of choice now often taken for granted.
Of course, any precise line-drawing will draw legitimate protest. I am not about to pronounce upon whether one or two or three televisions are enough for a two-person household. Furthermore, the problem of expensive tastes is real and means that the calibration of needs, conveniences, and luxuries is a dynamic, subjective process. Even religious orders that pride themselves on egalitarianism realize this and pace the adoption charity as one spends on gifts. 116 Others employ a "yoking map," which commits them to advance the welfare of a particular impoverished place or person.
117
The beauty of this process is that it can be justified entirely with reference to the effects on the giver. Although critics have suggested that Singer's ethic might lead to demoralizing self-instrumentalization, the "practices of the self" 118 required to advance it are in fact a way of defying such an outcome. The freer we are from the need to consume, the less our vocational and personal choices hinge on the maintenance of a certain lifestyle. 119 We move from having to being-from accumulating things to appreciating the present. In other words, the utilitarian advocates of tithing ethics can supplement their consequentialism with an account of the good that tithing does for the giver.
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V. Conclusion
Consider a fearful symmetry of 1998. As surgeons in France perfected the first human hand transplant, rebels in Sierra Leone terrorized opponents by cutting off their hands. 121 As the "First World" chalked up yet another technological achievement, yet another part of the third world slipped into anarchy. Such juxtapositions indicate the breadth of the divergence of world living standards. 122 Perhaps the new technology might someday be used for the poor as well as the rich. Certainly as productivity in developed nations grows, we can expect more of our surplus to be charity for less developed countries. Many progressive economists would insist that even the most baroque contemporary technologies play some role in fueling a global economy that will eventually benefit all. The hand surgeon may eventually volunteer for Medecins sans Frontieres.
But one can tell a different story about technology-indeed, a story more expressive of the practices of inequality now manifest in the global economy.
Worldwide, more than 1 billion people live on less than $1 a day. As their lives, practices, and concerns grow more distant from our own it is easy to imagine the flagging of worldwide movements of sympathy and practical solidarity. Technology can either help knit the world together or entrench existing inequalities ever more deeply.
Political institutions can do little to advance either outcome. Individuals who care must start taking personal responsibility. As the competitive pressures of globalization compel national governments to reduce taxation levels, and more and more public duties are undertaken by international institutions lacking a tax base, systematic voluntary giving will take on increasing importance in relieving suffering and remedying absolute poverty. If these functions are to be performed well by NGO's in the future, they will need steady and widespread financial support. Well-off citizens are collectively responsible for providing it.
Considering the moral force of such global obligations, Stanley Hoffman concluded that "our state of conscience is somewhere between the argument that we owe nothing, except a dole, to those outside our community, and the argument that we owe the same thing, full justice, to all mankind." 123 I hope the foregoing reflections have proven that most of us need to move towards the latter position. By revising and extending Unger's, Singer's, and Cohen's efforts to connect political philosophy to personal behavior, I have presented a case for systematic giving and methods for quantifying that burden. The relief of absolute poverty is an enormous and complex endeavor.
Nevertheless, it is an indispensable part of any life well lived, and any "coherent social faith," of our age.
123 "Problems of Distributive Justice," in DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS, 165.
